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This research paper discusses the role of virtual environments in digital forensic 
investigations.  With virtual environments becoming more prevalent as an analysis tool in digital 
forensic investigations, it’s becoming more important for digital forensic investigators to 
understand the limitation and strengths of virtual machines. The study aims to expose limitations 
within commercial closed source virtual machines and open source virtual machines. The study 
provides a brief overview of history digital forensic investigations and virtual environments, and 
concludes with an experiment with four common open and closed source virtual machines; the 
effects of the virtual machines on the host machine as well as the performance of the virtual 
machine itself. My findings discovered that while the open source tools provided more control 
and freedom to the operator, the closed source tools were more stable and consistent in their 
operation. The significance of these findings can be further researched by applying them in the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 History of Computer Forensic Investigations 
 
Computer forensics investigations really began to take shape when congress passed a 
series of laws starting in the 1980’s in response to growing occurrence of computer related 
crime. Most notably is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (aka 18 U.S.C. § 1029 & 
1030). The act was originally designed to target hackers who accessed computers to steal 
information or to disrupt or destroy computer functionality, as well as criminals who possessed 
the capacity to access and control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives. Another 
key piece of legislation pivotal to the history computer investigations was the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA Pub. L. 99-508, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848, 18 
U.S.C. § 2510.) It was enacted by Congress to extend government restrictions on wiretaps from 
telephone calls to include transmissions of electronic data by computer.  More importantly, the 
ECPA was an amendment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which 
was largely designed to prevent unauthorized government access to private electronic 
communications. With legislation in place to regulate computer investigation, it became 
inherently important that forensic investigators tool kits needed to expand and be accurate to 
present credible evidence in the court of law. 
During the early stages of digital forensics investigations law enforcement faced the 
burden of proving that their data collection methods were “forensically sound”.  In research 




called this early phase the ‘Adhoc Phase”.  The adhoc phase of digital forensic investigations is 
characterized by “a lack of structure, a lack of clear goals, and a lack of adequate tools, processes 
and procedures. At this time it was not uncommon to see an organization’s management 
carefully collect evidence that IT equipment was being used “inappropriately” by an individual, 
only to find that HR and Corporate Counsel would refuse to act citing the lack of a published 
appropriate use policy”(2009)  .  
 From then on investigations transitioned from various phases. Starting with having 
inadequate tools, to better tools, to pioneering how crimes involving technology are investigated. 
In addition to developing tools to aid forensic investigations, numerous laws have been 
developed in attempt to be in step with the crimes that are committed with computers. 
Admittedly the law is not completely in step with technology.  One of the most pioneering and 
useful innovations was the introduction of disk drive duplication on 1991. ICS was the pioneer of 
this technology. The importance of this invention to digital investigations is that the exact 
duplicate of the original can be investigated with compromising the original piece of evidence. 
Another example, of a pioneering and invaluable tool is virtual environments, which will be 
discussed in more depth in succeeding chapters and the focus of experimentation. 
1.2 Introduction of Virtual Environments 
 
Let’s begin with a definition of a virtual machine (VM).  A VM is a software program 
that behaves and executes programs like a physical machine (also known as the host). A virtual 




computer’s hard drive, RAM, Ethernet connections and utilizes it processors. In other terms, “a 
virtual machine or VM “is the construct of a program that behaves so much like a real machine 
that an OS, or other program written to run alone on a real machine, is fooled into thinking that it 
is running on a real bare machine by itself” (Gibson, Virtual Machine History & Technology. 
Security Now!, 2006).  IBM is credited with creating the first major system with virtual memory 
around 1967 with its 360 model 67.  Following the CP 67 model was the VM/370, “a direct 
descendant of CP 67, was used about equally by users of CMS and those who needed to run 
various alternate operating systems for reasons such as testing” (Gibson, 2006). Virtualization 
was first implemented by IBM as a way to logically partition mainframe computers into separate 
virtual machines. The partitions allowed mainframes to “multitask. At the time, mainframes were 
expensive; resource partitioning allowed organizations to benefit from the investment in such as 
machine. In a 1974 paper entitled “Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third generation 
Architecture” by Popek and Goldberg outlines three essential characteristics of a Virtual 
Machine. First, it provides an environment that is nearly identical to the original machine. 
Secondly, programs that are run within the virtual environment will only show minor decreases 
in speed. Lastly, the virtual machine monitor is in complete control of system resources. 
Following the development of x86 servers and client server applications that led to 
distributed computing, virtualization was more or less abandoned in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
Windows and Linux operating systems took ground and became very popular during this time.  
With that popularity, came many challenges in terms of analyzing data from these systems. 
VMWARE the leading company in virtualization cited the following reasons for the 




• Low Infrastructure Utilization 
• Increasing Physical Infrastructure Costs 
• Increasing IT Management Costs 
• Insufficient Failover and Disaster Protection.  
• High Maintenance end-user desktops and the numerous challenges present. 
Oracle’s Virtual Box, VMware’s Workstation, Cooperative Linux, and Citrix’s XEN 
Desktop are just a handful of the virtualization tools that are currently on the market; they will be 
the focus of the experimental portion of this paper. Each of the before mentioned VMs represent 
some of the diverse flavors that exist, such as desktop virtualization, cooperative virtualization 
and the traditional VM concept. 
1.2.1 Desktop Virtualization 
Desktop virtualization aims to segregate a personal computer desktop from a physical 
machine using a client-server model in which a central server stores the "virtualized" desktop, in 
lieu of local storage on the remote client; when users work from their local machine, each and 
every one of the programs, applications, processes, and data used are kept and run on the central 
server (see fig. 1). This enables end-users to run operating system and execute applications from 
a mobile device or thin client, which would normally surpass the hardware available on the 







Figure 1: Desktop Virtualization Architecture 
 
1.2.2 Cooperative Virtualization 
 
The premise of cooperative virtualization is that the guest and host share existing 
resources on the physical machine. The host and the guest OS both share the same resources and 
run parallel to each other (see fig.2). Via the CVM (Cooperative Virtual Machine) the guest OS 







Figure 2: Cooperative Virtualization Architecture 
1.2.3 Traditional Virtualization 
 
Within a Traditional VM concept, the resources of the host machine are virtualized for 
every guest OS.  This includes network resources, memory, hard drive size, etc.  One physical 
machine can run multiple operating systems simultaneously.  Each instance of a VM can run 
different operating systems (see fig. 3). The ability to run different OSs is accomplished through 
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system that is made by combining a software application (e.g., server software) with just enough 
operating system for it to run optimally on industry standard hardware or a virtual machine (e.g., 
VMware, VirtualBox, Xen HVM, KVM)” (What is a virtual appliance?, 2008). The most 
common format is OVF. Open Virtualization Format (OVF) is an open standard for packaging 









Figure 3: Traditional Virtualization Architecture 
1.3 Role of VMs and their Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Now that the various types of virtual machine have been established we can delve into 
the advantages and disadvantages. There are a number of advantages that exist in using a VM in 
the world of computer forensics. VMs are often referred to as sand boxes.  This is due to the fact 
that everything done within the VM is contained within the application and does not cross over 
into the underlying system or any other applications.  This can be useful when investigating the 
effects of malware or understanding the makeup of a suspect system. Typically a forensically 
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sound copy of suspect system or files would be mounted onto the virtual machine which has the 
respective operating system installed. At which point, theoretically, the investigator is able to 
examine the system as if he/she were sitting in front of actual PC, the image came from. A 
virtual environment gives investigators a type of freedom that cannot be experienced if they were 
analyzing an original version of evidence.  Investigators can make an attempt to mimic suspect 
environments without compromising original evidence or suspect systems. 
As with some advances in technology there can be negative implications associated 
innovation. One of the more prevalent issues that virtual environments present is that the 
existence of a VM on a user’s PC may indicate, but not necessarily, that steps may have been 
taken to mask criminal activity or activity that is against corporate policy. Because all of the 
action within a VM is encapsulated within it, its very existence doesn’t constitute foul play, but it 
certainly has the propensity to hide it. This very fact often damages the credibility of the 
evidence found in many cases.   The investigator must ask several questions during in analysis in 
these types of cases for example: 1) what remnants are left behind on the host, if any? 2) How 
will this evidence be received in court? 3) What actions were taken within reasonable certainty 
on the VM? 
Technological advances in virtualization tools essentially make removable media a PC 
that can be carried around in a pocket or around a neck. Running operating systems and 
applications within a VM leaves very little trace on the host system.  The existence of a VM does 
not automatically infer the cover up of a crime or wrongdoing but it certainly complicates 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Choosing a virtualization tool has become a contest of which one is more popular or user 
friendly.  But does anyone really know the capabilities of the tools or selection, beyond what 
GUI is easy to deal with? Or more importantly what tools is more appropriate to accomplish the 
task at hand and what of kind stress they put on host systems. There is a gap in knowledge about 
the true capabilities of various open and closed source virtual machines. The aim of this research 
is to understand the architecture and limitations of various VM’s and their implications on the 
analysis phase of digital forensics investigations. Closed and open source virtual machines are 
becoming an increasingly popular tool used in the analysis phase of computer forensic 
investigations.  The role of VMs within investigations has expanded in conjunction with the 
capabilities they have come to posses over their brief history.  There is a need to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of them beyond what is contained in vendor factsheets or online 
forums for as the findings found from using VM for evidence analysis are used in litigation. The 
findings hold a degree of accountability on the examiner to fully understand the tools used to 
analyze important those forensic examiners.  
2.1 Literature Review 
There have been many articles and research efforts that discuss the evolution of virtual 
machines and their use as an analysis tool in computer forensic investigations.  These pieces are 
relevant to this case study because they set the framework for exploring the implications virtual 




assessment of the how these tools operate in terms of forensic applications and known 
limitations. The framework that is the basis for this study is segmented into three parts: 
• Evolution of virtual machines to provide some history 
• Role and capabilities of virtual machines in the analysis phase  
• Challenges of using them and potential areas for more research 
These stages are evidenced by the following sources: 
2.1.2. Virtualization and Digital Forensics: A Research and Education Agenda 
 
In a study titled “Virtualization and Digital Forensics: A Research and Education 
Agenda” some of the issues and capabilities of virtual environments relevant to the time the 
study were discussed such as scalability and future support.  This particular work discusses the 
issues and capabilities of virtual environments at the time the study was written. A discussion of 
open source and commercial virtualization environments and their impacts on digital forensics is 
also a focal point of this article. Lastly this piece of research also develops ideas for new research 
categories in regards to virtualization. Within those discussions the authors make valid points 
that virtualization is a continuously changing landscape and needs more focused research to 
better understand how it can be used on the field. 
2.1.3. Forensic Examination of Volatile System Data Using Virtual Introspection 
 
This research paper discusses the sensitive nature of volatile memory and the challenges 
it presents to forensic investigators in the analysis phase of digital forensic investigations. The 




presents significant risks and challenges to forensic investigators as observation techniques are 
generally intrusive and can affect the system being observed” (Hay & Nance). 
The authors investigate one possible resolution to this issue is by suggesting perform live 
analysis on a target system using virtual introspection. Virtual inspection in the simplest of terms 
means the target system remains unchanged while being monitored via virtual machine monitor.  
This work further solidifies the positive aspects of introducing virtual environments to the digital 
forensic landscape. 
2.1.4   Computer Forensic Analysis in a Virtual Environment 
 
In a study entitled “Computer Forensic Analysis in a Virtual Environment” the potential 
role of virtual environments in the analysis phase of computer forensics investigations is 
researched. The authors assert that the conclusions they arrive to after some research is that 
computer forensic analysis in a virtual environment cannot be considered to be a replacement for 
conventional techniques of computer evidence collection and analysis. Part of research centers 
around VMware. The authors also attest that “VMware simulates different hardware than the 
hardware of the original Windows XP installation. We show that the environment created by 
VMware differs considerably from the original computer system, and because of that VMware 
by itself is very unlikely to produce court admissible evidence. Although “an additional 
advantage is that the virtual machine environment makes it easy to demonstrate the findings to a 
non-technical audience”  (Bem & E.H, 2007). 





Beckett and Slay attempt to research the issues surrounding the validation and 
verification of forensic software tools. I feel that this is an important article as it touches on the 
fact that many virtual machines are open source, and with the source code continuously changing 
there should be some sort of standard in regards to verifying the validity of the tool. With the 
forensic tool landscape always changing there is a growing need for standardization in terms of 
evaluating the products used by investigators on the field. One very valid a critical point raised 
by Beckett and Slay is “ the other problem faced is that not all tools used by specialists were 
designed originally with the forensic process in mind, instead developed to meet the needs of 
particular interest groups, such as file system drivers, operating systems, Indexing engines, etc.” 
This fact cannot be ignored in terms of the use of virtual environments. 
2.1.6  Virtualization and Forensics: A Digital Forensic Investigator’s Guide to Virtual 
Environments 
 
Barrett and Kipper investigates virtualized environments and how they have integrated 
themselves in computer forensics with the work entitled “Virtualization and Forensics: A Digital 
Forensic Investigator’s Guide to Virtual Environments.” The book explains the different types of 
virtualization, and how virtualization is integrated into the forensic process. The book explains 
how virtualization is used to retrieve artifacts on dead drives, live analysis and identify virtual 
activities. Barrett and Kipper touch on some issues presented by virtualization such as security, 





2.1.7  Virtual Forensics: A Discussion of Virtual Machines Related to Forensics Analysis by Ben 
Shavers 
 
 This article delves into the concept of the virtual machine, the uses of virtual machines, 
how to trace a virtual machine, the collection and recovery of deleted or encrypted virtual 
machines, and the imaging and cloning of virtual machines. Shavers also conduct a case study 
using VMware one of the more popular virtualization tools. The research exemplifies some of 
the capabilities at a high level that make virtual environments an optimal tool for investigators 
and also a burgeoning forensic tool. 
2.2 Research Purpose 
         The purpose of the research is to explore various open and closed source virtual machine 
tools within a digital forensic investigators toolkit. The aim is to have the forensic investigator 
look beyond the lure of a particular GUI/command line closed or open source applications and 
consider what makes a tool truly useful, and the implications said tool may have when used for 
investigatory purposes. A secondary goal is to provide more knowledge to the users of these 
tools by conducting an intensive study through application of these tools.  
The following research questions are being investigated: 
What criteria should investigators employ before integrating these tools within their 
existing labs? How do the interaction of the host and virtual machine affect each other? What 
limitations do these tools have when used in the analysis phase of an investigation? Are special 




  My hypothesis is the open sources tools will be more geared to the needs of an 
investigator do to the open source nature of the source code, but may prove to be less stable than 
its closed source counter parts.  I think that the closed sources tools may put more stress on the 
host systems.  The experimentation portion of the thesis will be organized in the following 
manner, an introduction of the virtual machine, data analysis, and discussion. Having laid 














CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Subjects/Sample 
Two open source VM’s and two closed VM’s were chosen as to have a decent sampling 
of what may be available to investigators at the present time. Open and closed source 
applications are prevalent tools within an examiners tool kit so in order to make this study more 
worthwhile and encompassing of some of the conditions on the field. Guest OS is defined as the 
operating system installed within the virtual environment.  Host is defined as the physical host 
machine where the virtual machine software is installed. 
The following Virtual Machines (VM) where chosen for this study: 
Cooperative Linux – aka CoLinux v. 0.7.3 
 
CoLinux is a Cooperative Virtual Machine. In contrast to a traditional VM, a CVM 
shares the resources that currently exist on the host OS.   The CVM gives both OSs complete 
control of the host machine while the traditional VM sets every guest OS in an unprivileged state 
to access the real machine. The key feature touted by CoLinux is that each kernel has its own 
complete CPU condition and allocated address space. Each kernel decides when to give control 
back to its partner. CoLinux kernel runs in a privileged mode with the host PC switching 
between host OS state and CoLinux kernel state. CoLinux has full control of the physical 
memory management unit (MMU). CoLinux is an open source tool. CoLinux runs an actual 
Linux kernel, and the Linux file system is stored as in image in a standard Windows file, 






VMware Workstation 7 
 
VMware Workstation 7 is distributed by VMWARE. Considered a traditional VM in 
which resources of the host machine are virtualized for every guest OS.  Some of the key 
features this tool offers are the ability to pause, copy, clone and create a team of VMs.  The 
“team” capability enables the user to create many different VMs that are able to launch at the 
same time and form a network. This feature can be valuable when simulating how different OS 
would interact when on the same network. Additionally this tool supports many OSes and there 
are exuberant amounts of virtual appliances available for download for free available on the 
World Wide Web. VMware Workstation 7 is a closed source tool. 
VirtualBox aka Oracle VM Virtual Box 4.0 
 
Virtual Box is an x86 virtualization software package developed by Sun Microsystems 
(which has been acquired by Oracle Corporation), and is completely an open source tool, 
although there is a closed source version available. VirtualBox much like VMware Workstation 
also allows for the pausing of virtual machines for resumption of its current state at a later 
junction in time.  Additionally, Virtual Box supports teleporting.  Teleporting provides a means 
of moving a VM over a network from one host to another. Lastly, but not all inclusive of this 
tool’s features is ability to control the host remotely via an unencrypted web service. Virtual Box 




Open Source Edition (OSE) was released as free software, subject to the requirements of the 
GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2. 
XEN Desktop 5.5 
 
Developed by Citrix, XenDesktop is a desktop virtualization tool. It separates a personal 
computer desktop environment from a physical machine using the client–server model of 
computing.  With XEN Desktop users can access virtual desktops from any PC, thin client, 
smartphone or tablet.  This tool centralizes applications on the server and with its Single sign-on 
feature users can access all applications they have permissions to all at once. XenDesktop is a 
closed source tool. 
3.2 Instruments/Measures 
Two Forensic PCs, for the purposes of this experiment the Forensic PC is defined as the 
PC’s had the necessary software needed to examine the compromised drive and was not the 
subject of the investigation.   One was a 64bit Windows 7 Laptop, and the other was a 32bit 
Windows XP Pro Desktop. Both were necessary to accommodate VM’s that had particular 
hardware specifications.  
Table 1 highlights the hardware comparison needs among other details of the four 





















Table 2: Forensic PC Specifications 
 Forensic PC 1 Forensic PC 2 
CPU 64 bit 32 bit 
OS Windows 7  Windows XP 
RAM 4GB 1GB 
PROCESSOR Intel I3 core CPU Intel duo core 
 
VM Test Subjects 









CPU 64bit and 32bit  64bit and 32bit 32bit only 64 bit 
OS Compatible with 
Windows 2000 
and higher and 
most Linux 
distributions. 
Works with Mac 
OS server MAC 
OS 2; 
 
All windows and 
Linux distributions 
CoLinux requires Windows 
2000, XP, 7 or Windows 
Server 2003 
All windows distributions Windows 








512 MB recommended 3 GB recommended 








. log, .VMDK, 
VMEM, .VMSN, 
.VMSD, .NVRAM, 
.VMX, .VMSS, VDI 
.FS XVF, OVA, OVF 
Interface GUI GUI Command Line Interface. GUI 
Monetary 
Cost 
Free 30 day free trial. 
 
Full version 
$162 as of 
11/21/2010 
Free Free Trial,  
 




Two PC images were created, one of a compromised Linux based system to 
accommodate the needs of CoLinux and another of a compromised PC running Windows 7 
operating system. Compromised PC for the purpose of this experiment is a PC that had various 
malware and virus on the hard drive.   The purpose of using a compromised system, was guided 
under the assumption that a normally running PC could not reasonably provide enough data to 
test the subsequent test areas and also analysis of a compromised image is more closely aligned 
with the use of virtualization tools in the computer forensic landscape. The images of the 
compromised PC then ran for several days within each of the open and closed VM’s.   The host 
system as well as the VM was monitored. The host systems were monitored using Windows 
Performance Monitor utility. In addition to monitoring the overall performance of the overall 
system the hardware needs, software dependencies, maintenance need of the host and VM were 
documented in order to exemplify what a computer forensics lab would need to consider in order 
to operate these tools. 
Image Details 
Linux Image 
The Linux system image was that of a system operating the Ubuntu distribution. This 
image was examined solely in the CoLinux virtual environment.  The system was infected with 
the Adore worm, which was discovered to be a call encapsulated in a script within a file called 
red.tar found on the PC. The typical behavior of this worm is to scan vulnerable hosts from 
indiscriminate Class B subnets on the victims network. Once a host is found, an attempt is made 




establishes a backdoor. The backdoor triggers when it receives a ping packet with correct 
identifying information and open a shell in the port 65535. The worm sends sensitive system 
data, such as the contents of the "/etc/shadow" file emails addresses programmed within the 
worm.  
The aforementioned was discovered during the course of the VM evaluation of the image 
I would create, as detailed in Section 3.  A DD image of the system was created and saved to the 
desktop of Forensic PC 2. The following commands were executed on the machine to create the 
DD image:  
In order to capture a record of the commands entered on the compromised PC, they were 
sent to the forensic machine by running the following: 
On the forensic works station at the command prompt: 
nc –v –l –p 2222 > LinuxImageLog.txt 
This serves as a road map and proof of the actions taken in the live/ behavioral analysis. 
The suspect hard drive was piped to the forensic machine using the following commands: 
First on the forensic machine: 
nc –l  -p 8888 > LinuxUbuntuImage.dd (Listening to Victim machine for dd image of hard drive) 
On the victim machine: 
dd if=source drive | nc ip_adress_forensic_pc2  8888 –w 3  
The resultant image is LinuxUbuntuImage.dd 
In order to examine the image the following commands were executed with the CoLinux Virtual 
Machine. 




sudo mount –t auto –o ro, LinuxUbuntuImage.dd 
2) Capture current network connections: 
netstat –an | nc forensic_workstation_ip 2222 
3) To capture internal routing table---typically used by hackers to reroute traffic 
netstat –rn | nc forensic_workstation_ip 2222 
4) A packet capture was also performed with tcpdump to view any changes in network activity 
that took place, and viewed within Wireshark. 
  Command to capture packets: 
                 tcpdump –v –w tcpdump.cap –Xx –s 0 
5) The following ps command displays all running process: 
ps aux | less 
Windows 7 PC 
A virus scan was run on the PC after witnessing abnormal behavior such as pop ups while 
not connected to Internet, slowed performance, and the occasional blue screen. The virus scan 
returned no results. It was determined further analysis would be needed within a controlled 
environment.  The analysis, discussed in a succeeding section revealed the abnormal behavior to 
be attributed malware program posing as an AntiVirus Software. The malware program tricks 
users into installing it by displaying fake messages that appear in their Web browsers claiming 
that the computer has been compromised. Upon installation, the program reports fabricated or 
exaggerated system security threats on the users PC. 
A dead acquisition of a 80GB hard drive operating Windows 7 was acquired using FTK 




and un-partitioned space) of the hard drive. The acquired image was named 
WINDOWS7_VM_TEST_80GB.E01 and saved to the desktop of the forensic PC 1. 
In order for the image to be mounted into Virtual Box and XenDesktop it needed to be 
converted into the applicable formats supported by the respective Virtual Machines.  Disk image 
mounting of forensic images for the purposes of booting the image as a disk in a virtual machine 
environment can be accomplished a number of ways, the tool Mount Image Pro is capable of 
mounting Encase images, DD images, and SMART images as drive letters, this was the method 
chosen to mount the image into the previously mentioned environments. 
OUTLINE OF COMROMISED PC ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the compromised PC images within the VMs was accomplished using the 
various methods such as analysis of network traffic logs within WireShark, analysis of process 
logs, registry logs. A packet capture was created with tcpdump to view any changes in network 
activity that took place was viewed within Wire shark.  For example, below is a packet capture 
of the activity of the Adore Worm.  It was observed that there were repeated attempts to search 







On the Windows 7 PC, the following was noted: 
  
The following executable was found:  
%Temp%\avXXX.exe  
This executable appeared to have created the following files: 
%fpatterson%\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch\Antivirus XXX.lnk 
%fpatterson%\Desktop\Antivirus XXX.lnk  
%fpatterson%\Start Menu\Antivirus XXX\Antivirus XXX.lnk 
%fpatterson%\Start Menu\Antivirus XXX\Help.lnk  
%fpatterson%\Start Menu\Antivirus XXX\Registration.lnk  
Information found on Symantec’s website, indicated the behavior noted on the PC and the 




3.3 Data Analysis of Virtual Machine 
 
For the data analysis I looked at 5 key areas for each VM:  
• Installation process and the VM dependency on other tools/apps. 
• Host performance  
The following criteria were used to establish host performance level: 1) Amount of CPU 
usage on physical machine after launching VM 2) number of open processes after 
establishing running VM. 3) Virtual memory and physical memory statistics 4) Crashes 
5) use of network bandwidth and resources. 
• VM Performance evaluation aims to address such questions as, did the tool crash or 
malfunction under certain conditions? Do the key advertised features function as 
anticipated?  How was the process of updating and managing the tool? 
•  Vulnerabilities VM presents - Such as the VM being able to execute code on the host. 
• Limitations – such as over committing RAM, and inability to simulate certain devices. 
Finally based on the above results we determine the implications to forensic investigators. 
XenDesktop 5.5 
 
• Installation and dependencies 
 The installation requires two PCs, one to function as the desktop the other as the server.  A 
zip file with 8 files including an ISO image had to be burned onto a CD in order to download the 




video available on the web from Citrix. Citrix recommends having 3GB memory available to 
server.  
 In order for the application to function properly there are many dependencies on a variety 
of Microsoft applications, suites, and services. XEN Desktop depends on .NET framework 
version 2 or higher, Microsoft SQL Express 2008 R2, Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Runtime, 
Microsoft IIS, Visual J# 2.0 SE, and Java Runtime Environment 1.5.0.15.  In addition, the 
following Citrix tools must be installed as well: The Desktop delivery controller which assigns a 
desktop to the user upon login and gives access to a pool of applications, XenServer hypervisor 
provides an environment in which to run the virtualized desktop and lastly XenDesktop must be 
installed on the client machine. The golden image aka the master image is the desktop image that 
is going to be streamed from the server to the various VM’s when the user logs into the 
environment via the web.  
 Citrix maintains the following stance regarding the use of the “golden image”: “we have a 
model within Xen Desktop where all VMs boot off the same OS golden image and all have the 
same base applications. To deliver a user-specific model, user-specific applications are streamed 
into the VM based on the user’s roaming profile. This approach minimizes the number of OS 
images and VMs that need to be stored. Anything that’s written to disk by an executing VM is 
cached locally in the VM and never written back to the hard drive, and all changes are discarded 
on every reboot. For certain classes of users, such as call center operators, this approach works 
very well” (Creeger, 2010). 
 There are different methods of establishing a virtual machine image, for instance and ISO 




web, or a using Xen Convertor on a local drive (C:\, D:\, etc.) can be used to convert into the 
following formats: Xen Virtual Appliance, OVF package, or provisioning services disk, or 
import a virtual machine that XenDesktop accepts. 
• Host performance 
The compromised image ran for several days and using the tracert command I found that 
latency was around 90ms on my FIOS connection.  Which is not terrible considering the 
intensive back and forth between the client and the server. Average CPU was 57% of what was 
available on the forensic PC. There was increased network activity in comparison to that of the 
other Virtual machines evaluated as was expected to the nature of the server-client setup.  The 
running of the XenDesktop established a process for the desktop controller, XenServer, 
XenDesktop, and XenCenter. 
• VM Performance 
There is most definitely a dependency on the server being up running so the desktop to can 
be accessed and utilized.  To test the resilience of the server attack packets were sent using the 
AttackPing application to the PC functioning as the server. It must be noted that the server had 
no firewall settings or configurations blocking certain port activity. The following behavior was 
noticed on the client PC: 1) Stalling in the client when executing certain functions such opening 
applications within the virtual desktop. 2) Locked up sessions 3) Disconnected sessions. 
• Vulnerabilities VM presents 
The majority of the vulnerabilities presented by the XenDesktop lie heavily on the security 




network could provide a gateway for attacker to attack the server containing the image. A 
possible remedy is to have all the computers accessing the virtual environment protected by a 
firewall establishing program and port rules. The communications between the client (desktops) 
should be secured through encryption to also help mitigate the risk of infiltrating the network. 
• Limitations 
XenDesktop had a heavy dependency on having all network resources up and running.  If an 
instance existed when the server was down or connection was interrupted the VM experienced 
issues and in terms of performing forensic work this possibly would not be the most optimal 
implementation of this type of virtual machine configuration. 
There is also dependency on Active Directory to authentic and authorize users to access the 
Desktop image. Active Directory is required for XenDesktop utilization for authentication and 
authorization while using Active Directory provides some concealment of communication its not 
an all inclusive deterrent of the threats that exist. 
VMware Workstation 7 
 
• Installation process and dependencies 
Installation of the tool is fairly simplistic. After downloading and executing the installation 
wizard the application was up and available for use.  Installation took approximately 10 minutes.  
Many virtual appliances are available on the worldwide web for the plethora of operating 
systems available to use with this virtual machine.   During the set up of the actual virtual 
environment a few key prompts appeared, one for RAM allotment             (See fig. 4) another for 




up and running. Additionally, establishing either a bridged or NAT network can be accomplished 
by modifying the settings on the hardware tab. 
 
 
Figure 4: VMware Workstation 7 Hardware Settings 
• Host performance 
Upon the first start up the tool the vmware.exe process was established. After guest OSes 
were created within the tool each guest OS also established a process, vmware-vmx.exe.  In other 




machines each established a unique process (see fig 5). After monitoring the machine for 48 
hours the average total private working memory set of VMware Workstation 7 was 800,000 KB. 
Each individual set averaged 45,000 KB. The private memory working set is amount of memory 
an application absolutely needs to operate and cannot share in contrast to work set of memory, 
which all processes can share. The significance of this figure is that it helps determine the 
amount of memory solely dedicated to the process.  
 
Figure 5: VMware Workstation 7 Open Processes upon Startup 
When employing the “team” function I set up 3 OSes all 6GB in size, with the compromised 
images loaded to the respective OSes and started them, it was immediately noticed when 




than favorable to render when switching between them. Average time was 30 seconds to render 
the virtual machines desktop. In addition, when application outside of the virtual machine was 
opened such as Adode Flash and games, there was a lag in rendering images. For example, when 
Adobe Flash was used to took on average a full minute for the images I was attempting to view 
to render and become viewable.  This was noticed when 3 guest OSes were set up inside the 
virtual machines, in addition to instances when 6 OSes where within the VM operating within 
the “team function”. 
• VM Performance 
Under the same conditions noted previously when using the “team” the desktops within the 
VMs were slow to render when activated within team function.  In comparison to the boot up and 
shut down of a Virtual Machine within Virtual Box. VMWare Workstation 7 took two and half 
minutes longer to boot and a minute and half to completely shutdown.   
In the initial stages of establishing a network connection, difficulty was experienced 
establishing a bridged network, but establishing NAT connection was not an issue.  I presumed 
the issue could be a firewall, but the host PC did not have one set up. Uninstalling and 
reinstalling the program seemed to “fix” the issue.   
• Vulnerabilities VM presents 
I was unable uncover any vulnerabilities during my experimentation.  That by no means derives 





While not necessarily a limitation, but worth noting is the VMware Workstation uses the host 
systems actual time and adjust itself to match host time. This could be an issue potentially be an 
issue when attempting to mimic suspect pc’s environment. 
Oracle VM VirtualBox 4.0 
 
• Installation process and tool dependencies  
Similar to VMWARE Workstation installation was quite simplistic not time consuming, with 
the use of the installation and virtual machine set up wizard. Figure 6 below depicts the RAM 
allotment selection tool for the Guest OS. Virtual Box also allows the user to select hard disk 
size, network configuration such as bridged or NAT.  
 





• Host performance 
A considerable amount of CPU was used and memory was used. When the tool was booted it 
established process called VBoxSVC.exe, additionally when a new guest OS was added to the 
tool each established VirtualBox.exe process.  When more than one Virtual machine was 
established with the program each additional process drained quite a bit of the total CPU 
available on the host. Efficiency of other programs went down considerably, as they were slow 
to render and execute. 
• VM Performance   
Virtual Box allows snapshots of Virtual Machines to be taken. This enables the user to save a 
virtual machine in a particular state and return back to that state at later time. This proves 
invaluable when it’s necessary to pause in the midst of analysis. The tool can establish specific 
host directories as shared folders, which can be accessed within in the OS being run within 
Virtual Box. Additionally, USB devices are easily detected by Virtual Box can be used to 
transfer data between the host and Virtual Machine. 
• Vulnerabilities VM presents 
VirtualBox’s web service allows the host to be controlled remotely. 
 The connection that is established is not encrypted. This can present risk to the host 
system. In addition to being able to control the host remotely there is also an added risk 
present with the teleporting feature.  As previously mentioned this feature allows for a 
VM over a network from one host to another, the vulnerability lies in the fact that anyone 





VirtualBox also had the tendency to crash when stressed when more than four virtual 
machine was running inside the program.   Unlike VMWare Workstation, Virtual box doesn’t 
allow booting directly from an Encase virtual (raw) disk. You need to perform additional step. 
By mounting and concerting the image into a file format can handle. VirtualBox also doesn’t 
support DD raw format natively so some additional conversion would need to be done with those 
types of images as well. Lastly a key, missing feature is the functionality to cut and paste 
between virtual machines.  
CoLinux v.0.7.3 
 
•  Installation process and tool dependencies 
CoLinux only works on a 32-bit PC. Images for desired OSes are available for download 
online. CoLinux needs the WinPCap library for bridged Ethernet support. The majority of the 
configurations are established in the .conf file such as memory, kernel, networking and Guest 
OS.  See fig.6 for sample config file.  CoLinux hard-drive images are standard Windows .fs files 
of the same size as the virtual hard drive.  For example a 1GB Ubuntu guest OS would look 
something like this “Ubuntu-9.04.ext3.1gb.fs” the config file would reference this image in order 
to boot an Ubuntu OS.   CoLinux emulates hardware Ethernet network via TAP, PCAP, NDIS 
and SLiRP (see fig.7) utilities. Upon boot putting of the system it starts a col-linux slirp process.  
Increasing the size of the file system is simplistic. It was as simple as swapping out one 













• Host performance 
Although both kernels theoretically have full access to the host PC’s real hardware, 
technology has not progressed in matter where a system can actually controlled by two different 
operating systems at the same time. The host kernel is in fact in control of the real hardware and 
the guest kernel employs special drivers that communicate with the host and provide devices to 
the guest OS.   CoLinux established 3 processes upon start up of the environment; one for 
networking, console and one for the service between the host. 
 
 





• VM Performance 
By chance it was discovered that when graphic intensive applications where functioning the 
background such as flash player, the linux system experiences issues with memory.  There were 
no other abnormal or outstanding observations discovered in the course of evaluating the image 
contents or the host machine. Below is a memory usage command executed on the Linux system 
depicting the amount memory used by the CoLinux. 
root@CoLinux:~# free –t 
                   total     used        free       shared buffers cached 
Mem:       872100   750000   122100      0    9400    109756 
-/+ buffers/cache:   65856     607308 
Swap:      557048    477700   79348 
 Total:    1293556   808756 
• Vulnerabilities presented by VM 
Running CoLinux involves having the host constantly switch between host OS state and 
CoLinux kernel state can create some instability in performance on the host. Additionally any 
kernel issues on the Guest OS can manifest itself onto the host because of sharing nature of the 
environment. Memory allocation issues can be problem with CoLinux when graphic intensive 
programs are running on the host PC. So it would appear that the Linux system had run out of 
memory.  Thankfully Linux systems use swap files.   The use of the free command, or top 
command can give the user and idea of what processes are using the most memory and if the 
swap file feature is enabled. Also, since the windows files are made available to CoLinux if a 
Linux system is passes on file that is detrimental to a windows file system and vice versa that 





CoLinux only virtualizes hard disk and network resources but not graphics. Additionally, the 
host must have an OS kernel that can handle export primitives in order to allow the CoLinux’s 
portable driver to run in CPL0 mode and allocate memory. Lastly, in order to fully use CoLinux 
you need to have full administrators rights.  When installed the program tells Windows its using 





















CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
It was discovered that the propensity of the VM to crash is inversely related to RAM 
allotted to each VM in correlation to the RAM available on the host machine. As the percentage 
of RAM allotted to the VM increases vs. what is available the host and VM became unstable, 
slow, and crashed. Figure 9, below indicates the relationship between the numbers of crashes as 
it relates to RAM allotment for VirtualBox1 and VMware Workstation2.  Both Virtual Box and 
VMware Workstation allow the user to choose how much RAM to allocate to the guest OS, with 
512 being the recommended allotment. VMware and VirtualBox were both installed on Forensic 
Machine 1, which had 4GB available. More crashes occurred as the memory allotted to the came 
closer to the amount available on the host machine.  Over committing the memory caused swap 
file issues, which made the host unstable. In terms of computer forensics lab this could prove to 
be an issue if the machine doesn’t have an enough RAM which would in turn cause possible 
disrupting activity within the analysis phase. 
                                                 
 
 
1 All references to Virtual Box within this document pertain to Oracle VM Virtual Box version 
4.0.8 
2 All references to VMWare Workstation 7 within this document pertain to VMWare 





Figure 9:  VM crashes in relation to physical memory allotment 
Figure 10 below depicts the maximum RAM, CPU consumption, and network resource 
usage percentage over the 48-hour period the compromised images ran within the VM’s.  I 
suspected that since XenDesktop3 was using the client-server model the network resource usage 
would be higher in comparison to the other virtualization tools in this study. XenDesktop, 
VirtualBox, and VM VirtualBox all ran on the 64bit machine. The left axis depicts the 
percentage of the resource used versus what is available. 
                                                 
 
 

























Figure 10: CPU consumption, Memory Usage, Network traffic 
It was also discovered that the more time spent setting up the application meant 
considerable time was spent maintaining it. Figure 11 below depicts in minutes the time it took 
to install tool vs. the maintenance involved afterwards.  XenDesktop took a considerable amount 




















             
Figure 11: Set up time vs. maintenance time in minutes 
Figure 12 below depicts the virtual machines effect on the host in terms of physical 
memory usage, host network usage, and host swap file usage as a percentage. Xen Desktop 
consumed the most network resources and Co Linux 4 and VMWare Workstation used the least 
amount consuming between 20%-25%.  Swap file usage is significant measure as it gives insight 
to how the host is managing memory outside of RAM. 
                                                 
 
 





























Figure 12: Host Performance with Virtual Machines running 
Table 3 below demonstrates some key functional features that each Virtual Machine offered. 








































Each virtual machine had variable limitations noted during experimentation.  Table 4 below  
attempts to condense the limits each Virtual Machine possesses.  
Table 4: Limits 
Limits VMWare 
Workstation 7 




Yes No No Yes 
Co-dependencies 
outside of host 
Low Low Low High 
File Transfer 
from Host to VM 
Available Not Available Available Available 
Guest OS 
support 
High High Limited High 
 
Here are the definitions of the before mentioned limits: 
Many File Formats Supported = High number of virtual file formats supported 
Co-dependencies outside of host is a determination as to whether the Virtual Machine has high 
dependency on other application in order to work properly.  i.e. need active directory to manage 
users such as XenDesktop. 
File transfer from Host to VM – direct availability to transfer files from host to Virtual Machine 
Guest OS support – means the Virtual Machine supports many different OSes available on the 







CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Major Findings 
Since digital evidence is so volatile it is imperative that the tools being used to preserve 
and analyze it are efficient, intuitive, reliable, and accurate. My research uncovered that while 
Xen is more stable but requires a lot of maintenance to maintain network connections and had 
many dependencies on various other applications. This could prove cumbersome to an 
investigator do the expediency in which some evidence needs to be examined. XenDesktop 
allows a lot of flexibility and options in terms establishing a master image. The tool allowed for 
the use of an ISO as an image, converting existing Virtual machine formats to ones acceptable by 
the application.  The flexibility to establish a golden image from many different formats is a plus 
and one less potential task on the part of the investigator. 
Virtual Box offers control to the investigator.  It offers cloning ability so the investigator 
can examine the image without the trepidation of damaging the image. This is invaluable feature 
for any user. Virtual Box installation was very simplistic and the design of the graphical user 
interface was very intuitive. VMware workstation offer the same control and I found many 
similarities between the two from interface decision to architecture. Although, when many VM’s 
were paused Virtual Box rendered quicker than employing the same scenario in VMWARE. 
Rendering on average 20 seconds quicker. VMWare Workstation and Virtual Box shared many 
similarities.  
With CoLinux sharing hardware resources the user must always be cognizant of needs of 
the host and virtual environment. CoLinux can’t really operate as its own machine. A virtual 




CoLinux.wikia.com sums up the relationship as the following: “If you run a MySQL database on 
the Linux, there's no problem accessing it via TCP/IP from the Windows. From the host's 
standpoint, CoLinux is just another computer on the network (Cooperative Linux FAQ).” 
Updates where more readily available and come at a more frequent pace for the open 
source tools. The closed source tools were on a more scheduled release of updates or new 
versions. 
5.2 Implications of the Findings 
Investigators should ask themselves the following: Does the tool fit the task, in regards to 
human resources and lab resources? Does the investigator understand the architecture of the tool 
to where they may understand produces undesirable behavior? Largely I found that most issues 
surrounded over committing RAM and causing Swap issues.  In terms of design and layout all 
were intuitive although, XenDesktop had a learning curve to surpass. The many services required 
to get a complete and fully functional XenDesktop virtual machine took considerable about of 
trial and failure. 
In my opinion XenDesktop is designed to be more of an enterprise solution. Although 
there can be forensic application it was not designed with a forensic investigators needs in mind.   
Each VM exhibited a varying degree of unstable performance in term of the ability to execute a 
certain task but unstableness did not affect accuracy of the results.   I believe this instability is 
largely dependent on the stress and workload each VM forced onto the host system.  From a 




forensic labs may have as they are free.  Absent of any major functional flaws, there is no 
inherent reason an investigator couldn’t count on the open source tools for analysis purposes. 
5.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
      The study is not all inclusive of the VM’s available on the market rather it focuses on four 
particular VM’s that span the market. Suggestions for other areas of research include examining 
case study where VM use has presented an issue for investigators in litigation cases and 








1 All references to Virtual Box within this document pertain to Oracle VM Virtual Box version 
4.0.8 
2 All references to VMWare Workstation 7 within this document pertain to VMWare 
Workstation version 7.0.1 
3 All References to Xen Desktop within this document pertain to Xen Desktop version 5.5 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Barrett, D., & Kipper, G. (2010). Virtualization and Forensics: A Digital Forensic Investigator's 
Guide to Virtual Environments. Burlington: Elsevier Science and Technology. 
Bem, D., & E.H. (2007). Computer Forensic Analysis in a Virtual Environment. International 
Journal of Digital Evidence , II (2), 1-13. 
Gibson, S. (2006, July 27). Virtual Machine History & Technology. Retrieved August 8, 2010, 
from GRC| Security Now!!: http://www.grc.com/sn/SN-050.htm 
Hay, B., & Nance, K. (2008). Forensic Examination of Volatile System Data Using Virtual 
Instropection. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review , XLII (3), 74-82. 
Nance, K., & M.B. (2008). Virtual Machine Introspection: Observation or Interference? IEEE 
Security & Privacy , VII (5), 32-37. 
Pollitt, M., Craiger, P., & Nance, K. (2008). Virtualization and Digital Forensics: A Research 
and Education Agenda. Journal of Digital Forensics Practice , II (2), 62-73. 
Shavers, B. (2008). Virtual Forensics: A Discussion of Virtual Machines Related to Forensic 
Analysis. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from ForensicFocus: 
http://forensicfocus.com/downloads/virtual-machines-forensics-analysis.pdf 
VMWARE. (2010). Virtualization Basics. Retrieved August 8, 2010, from VMWARE: 
http://www.vmware.com/virtualization/history.html 
What is a virtual appliance? (2008). Retrieved March 11, 2011, from Turnkey Linux: 
http://www.turnkeylinux.org/virtual-appliance 
Creeger, M. (2010). CTO Roundtable: Virtualization Part II Retrieved August 9, 2011, from 
ACM QUEUE http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1838664 
CoLinux. (2010). Cooperative Linux FAQ. Retrieved September 9, 2011,  from 
http://CoLinux.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ 
Popek,G., Golberg, R. (1974). Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third Generation 
Architecture. Retrieved November 10, 2011.  Association for Computing Machinery. 
 
 
